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The rise and (coming) fall of
efficiency as the ruler of antitrust

BY ROBERT H. LANDE*

Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are
able to give a firm answer to one question: What is
the point of the law-what are its goals? Everything
else follows from the answer we give.
R. BORK, The Antitrust Paradox at 50 (1978)

The debate over the legitimate goals of antitrust is ceaseless and
its practical resolution influenced by politics. The answer often
given in the past, and particularly during the Warren Court era
when a heavy emphasis was placed on social and political factors,
contrasts sharply with the consensus view during the Reagan
Administration that only economic efficiency counts. Since antitrust moves in cycles, a natural question arises-will antitrust
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continue to stand upon a foundation of efficiency, return to the
old social and political perspective, or embrace some third view
of its proper direction?
This article will trace the genesis of the efficiency approach to
antitrust and attempt to predict its future. Although the efficiency approach has triumphed over the social and political view
through clever articulation and a promise of superior implementation and predictability, it too is likely to be replaced, by a
"price to consumers" or "wealth transfer" standard. This new
approach asserts that the antitrust laws were enacted to give
consumers the right to purchase competitively priced goods. I It
condemns the use of market power to artificially raise prices and
stresses that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent wealth
extractions from consumers by firms with market power. Consumers, not cartels, were given the fruits of competitive capitalism. This article asserts that the wealth transfer approach is
starting to replace the efficiency standard and eventually will
succeed at implementing Congressional populist sentiment in an
administrable, predictable manner.
I. The rise of economic efficiency

A. Bork's "strict constructionist" view oj the legislative history
The view of the goals of the antitrust laws that almost universally prevailed until less than a generation ago was decidedly
populist. Various social and political goals were deemed important to the antitrust laws' framers. These included the prevention of industrial concentration, 2 the reduction of the political
1
This article will argue that Congress, in passing the antitrust
laws, helped to define the property right that we today term "consumers
surplus," and awarded this property right to consumers. Congress condemned the uncompensated taking of this property right by firms with
market power.

2 Arnold, The Economic Purpose oj the Antitrust Laws, 26
L.J. 207, 207-08 (1955).

MISS.
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influence of large firms and promotion of individual liberty, 3
the promotion of small business and the creation of entrepreneurial opportunity.4 The social and political view held center
stage virtually until the advent of the Reagan Administration,S
and appears to have breathed its dying gasp only under the
administration of Chairman Pertschuk, head of the Federal
Trade Commission during the Carter Administration. 6
Few antitrust scholars believe that antitrust should return to
a Warren Court approach based largely upon social and political concerns.' Today there is a consensus that this type of antitrust was far too interventionist. In addition to overly strict
substantive standards, the excesses included the practical problems that inevitably arose in the implementation of a relatively

3
See, e.g., Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 377, 377-82 (1965).

4
Id. at 382-84; Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts? 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191

(1977).
5
Many moderate and liberal antitrust academics began to move
away from the social and political orientation well before 1980. Many
politicians, antitrust enforcers and judges were, however, somewhat
slower to rely completely upon economic analysis.
6
See, for example, M. Pertschuk, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Remarks a1 The Eleventh New England Antitrust Conference,
Boston, Massachusetts 10 (November 18, 1977):
[A]lthough efficiency considerations are important, they
alone should not dictate competition policy. Competition policy
must sometimes choose between greater efficiency, which may
carry with it the promise of lower prices, and other social
objectives, such as the dispersal of power, which may result in
marginally higher prices. I~ 1977, no responsive competition
policy can neglect the social and environmental harms produced
as unwelcome by-products of the marketplace: resource depletion, energy waste, environmental contamination, worker alienation, the psychological and social consequences of marketing
stimulated demands.

7
See, e.g., sources cited in Fox, The Modernization of the Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981).

432

The antitrust bulletin

amorphous social/political orientation. These problems helped
make the antitrust world receptive to a more conservative alternative that promised superior implementation, clarity and predictability.
If one scholarly work were singled out for credit for launching the efficiency-oriented view of antitrust it would surely be
the seminal 1966 article by (then) Professor Robert Bork,s the
foundation for both his own 1978 masterwork9 and the views of
countless other conservative scholars. lo Bork asserted that his
analysis was a strict constructionist view of the legislative history of the Sherman Act. In a lengthy, heavily footnoted text he
developed the argument that the original framers of the Sherman Act had a single intent: to enhance economic efficiency.
Bork argued that "[t]he whole task of antitrust can be summed
up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain
or a net loss in consumer welfare."11 Bork further asserted that
there was "not a scintilla of support" in the Act's legislative
history for "broad social, political, and ethical mandates. "12
Bork explicitly rejected distributive (i.e., wealth transfer) issues

8
Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.
L. & ECON. 7 (1966). For a more complete analysis of Bork's legislative
history conclusions see Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged,
34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).

9

R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).

10
For example, R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-23 (1976) did not undertake a detailed analysis of the Sherman
Act's legislative history. He instead approvingly cited Bork for the argument that Congress intended that only economic efficiency playa role in
antitrust. For other examples, see Lande, supra note 8, at 67-69.
In addition, Posner believes that monopoly profits may not exist;
what would otherwise be the transfer may be transformed into inefficiency through rent-seeking behavior. Id. at 11-12. If he is correct, the
wealth transfer and efficiency 'approaches to antitrust are similar or
identical.
11

R. BORK, supra note 9, at 91.

12

Bork, supra note 8, at 10.
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as a possible area of congressional concern: "[Ilt seems clear
the income distribution effects of economic activity should be
completely excluded from the determination of the antitrust
legality of the activity. It may be sufficient to note that the shift
in income distribution does not lessen total wealth. . . . "13
Bork developed his argument through a detailed analysis of
the 1890 legislative debates. He pointed to dozens of statements
revealing an overriding Congressional concern that trusts and
certain other business forms would acquire monopoly (or market) power that would give them the ability to artificially raise
prices and restrict output. 14 Bork wove these quotations into a
convincing case that this concern preoccupied Congress. IS He
then used modern economic analysis to explain how monopoly
power leading to higher prices for consumers can produce a
form of economic inefficiency termed "allocative inefficiency. "16 (The explanation of why monopoly pricing produces
allocative inefficiency, a reduction in the total wealth of society,
is extremely complex. I') Bork reasoned that since we now

13

R. BORK, supra note 9, at 111.

14
Bork, supra note 8, passim. For example, Senator Sherman
asked that Congress protect the public from trusts that "restrain commerce, turn it from its natural courses, increase the price of articles, and
therefore diminish the amount of commerce." 21 Congo Rec. 2462
(1890). Sherman also stated: "The sole object of such a combination is
to make competition impossible. It can control the market, raise or
lower prices, as will best promote selfish interests. . . . Its governing
motive is to increase the profits of the parties composing it. The law of
selfishness, uncontrolled by competition, compels it to disregard the
interest of the consumer. . . . [w]hen it embraces the great body of all
the corporations engaged in a particular industry in all of the States of
the Union, it tends to advance the price to the consumer of any article
produced." [d. at 2457.
15

Bork, supra note 8, passim.

16

[d.

17
To raise prices a monopoly reduces output from the competitive
level. The goods no longer sold are worth more to would-be purchasers
than they would cost society to produce. This foregone production of
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"know" that the "only" harm to "consumer welfare" from
higher prices is economic inefficiency, Congressional displeasure
with market power can fairly be equated with a concern about
economic efficiency. He then presented a smaller, although still
significant, number of quotations that manifest a Congressional
desire to preserve and enhance corporate productive efficiency. 18
On the basis of this evidence, Bork concluded that the antitrust
laws embody only a concern for "consumer welfare" which he
equated with the "maximization of wealth or consumer want
satisfaction"19 and the aggregate efficiency of our economy.20
Notice the subtle yet crucial change in terminology. Bork
used "consumer welfare" as an Orwellian term of art that has
little or nothing to do with the welfare of true consumers FI His
desire to maximize "consumer welfare" (which he defines as
economic efficiency) carries with it no concern about the wealth
extracted from consumers and transferred to firms with market
power as a result of the higher prices that arise from cartel or
other prohibited behavior. Bork thus defined "consumers" to
goods worth more than their cost is pure social loss and constitutes the
"allocative inefficiency" of monopoly. For example, suppose that widgets cost $1.00 in a competitive market (their cost of production plus a
competitive profit). Suppose a monopolist would sell them for $2.00. A
potential purchaser who would have been willing to pay up to $1.50 will
not purchase at the $2.00 level. Since a competitive market would have
sold them widgets for less than they were worth to him, the monopolist's reduced production has decreased the consumer's satisfaction
without producing any countervailing benefits for anyone. This pure
loss is termed "allocative inefficiency." For an extended discussion and
formal proof that monopoly pricing creates allocative inefficiency, see
E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND ApPLICATIONS 277-92 (4th
ed. 1982).
18

Bork, supra note 8, at 26-31.

19

Bork, supra note 8, at 7.

20

R. BORK, supra note 9, at 91.

21
Bork did not invent the term but chose it from the available
options.
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include monopolists and cartels. 22 Antitrust based on his definition of "consumer welfare" makes no distinction between
"real" consumers-the purchasers of goods and services-and
the firms with market power that raise prices and thereby
extract wealth from purchasers. Higher prices to consumers are
fine with Bork so long as the monopolist or the cartel produces
more efficiently. In fact, the only "consumers" sure to benefit
under Bork's regime are monopolists and cartels.23
The view that economic efficiency should be the only value
that counts in the antitrust analysis was quickly embraced by
the entirety of the Chicago School2A and many leading "moderate" antitrust analysts as well.2S Although this view had been
picking up adherents for more than a decade,26 it was not really
implemented until President Reagan's election.

22
I am indebted to Professor Salop for this and related articulations of this concept.
23
I am indebted to John Kirkwood for this formulation. He
observes that in a technical sense "consumer welfare" has increased but
that the cartels and monopolists acquire all of this increase. In the classic tradeoff situation "true" consumers gain none of the efficiency benefits, absorb some of the allocative inefficiency losses, and have their
surplus extracted by the firms with market power.
24
See sources cited supra note 10. Of course, some may have
adopted the belief that antitrust should be based entirely upon efficiency
for reasons having little or nothing to do with Bork's legislative history
analysis.

25
See, e.g., 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR ApPLICATION 149, n. 2 (1980).

26
Other milestones in the debate included two symposia: Antitrust
Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social
Goals ofAntitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977); The Goals of
Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965). The
1973 Airlie House Conference was also extremely influential. The
efficiency-oriented Chicago view largely triumphed over the social!
political view on all three occasions.
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B. Administrability arguments
Bork's argument that only an efficiency approach to antitrust is clear and predictable for businesses also won many converts to the efficiency school. Even many who strongly
suspected that Congress may have intended the antitrust laws to
encompass more had to admit that the social-and-political
school of antitrust was extremely difficult to administer. 27 Bork
recently has taken his assertion of superior administrability
much further; he has argued that courts cannot include values
other than economic efficiency in antitrust analysis "without
engaging in a task that is so unconfinedly legislative as to be
unconstitutional. "28
As a practical matter Bork admitted that to actually balance
the triangles and rectangles that inevitably arose from an
efficiency-based analysis was impossible on a case-by-case
basis. 29 But he asserted that only rules based on economic effi27
Consider the plight of an honest, aggressive business operating
under a "big is bad, small is good" antitrust regime. What mergers can
it lawfully undertake? What vertical restraints or pricing decisions can it
implement? What are the rules under which we judge its conduct? An
efficiency approach carried out through rules, such as clearly designed
merger guidelines (but not the relatively unprincipled analysis conducted
within the Reagan Administration) would indeed be more workable than
a "big is bad, small is good" approach.

28
TRUST

Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTIL.J. 21, 24 (1985).

29
Bork provided the following summary of what a case-by-case
efficiency analysis of a horizontal merger actually would involve:
Passably accurate measurement of the actual situation [including an estimate of efficiencies and deadweight loss] is not even a
theoretical possibility; much less is there any hope of arriving at
a correct estimate of the hypothetical situation. Consider two of
the factors that would have to be known: the demand curve
over all possible relevant ranges of output and the marginal cost
curve over those same ranges. Only by knowing where marginal
cost and demand intersect could one know whether there was a
restriction of output and what its size was. Nobody knows these
curves. Even the companies involved do not. . . .

(Footnote continued on following page)
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ciency could lead to predictable antitrust decisionmaking. By
avoiding the endless and imprecise debates over "how big is too
big," "how small is good" or "how much more should consumers pay to prevent bigness and/or preserve smallness," the
efficiency view of antitrust with its single quest offered the
promise of clarity and predictability. Under this approach the
decisionmakers were charged with figuring out, at least as a theoretical matter, the applicable triangles and rectangles, and then
with designing rules that would implicitly incorporate them.
(Baxter has similarly asserted that "economic efficiency provides the only workable standard from which to derive operational rules and by which the effectiveness of such rules can be
judged.»3O) Even those whose instincts told them something was
wrong with Bork's analysis of the legislative history were understandably dazzled by the economics and found it difficult to
answer Bork's administrability arguments.
The administrability claims may have gained more converts
than the belief that Congress in 1890 cared only about economic
efficiency. Perhaps what took place in the minds of most
observers was, in effect, the following: It is clear that in 1890
Congress was concerned with prices increasing as a result of
market power, and it is clear that higher prices lead to economic inefficiency. Since economic efficiency is much easier to
implement than a "big is bad, small is good" policy, let's
choose what seems to be a plausible view of the legislative history since it leads to the most predictable implementation.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
There is a good reason why firms do not know these things, and
it is the same reason why they cannot be known through an
antitrust trial. The demand curve is not known because it
changes continually and because the company is not constantly
plotting it by running its prices up and down. The attempt to do
so might make a minor contribution to science, but quite a
research grant would be required, since the losses incurred in an
attempt by a major company might make serious inroads on the
resources of even the Ford Foundation.
R. BORK, supra note 9, at 125-26.
30

CALIF.

Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftman's View, 71
L. REV. 618, 621 (1983) ("Draftman's View").

438 : The antitrust bulletin

Relative to the then-existing situation, the efficiency standard
certainly brought the promise of clarity and predictability. All the
decisionmakers had to do was ascertain and balance crisp, clear
triangles and rectangles that easily (?) could be predicted in
advance by the affected parties. Bork (and others) recognized,
moreover, that since rarely in practice could we accurately predict
or measure the appropriate efficiencies and inefficiencies, to
enhance administrability and predictability we should implement
the efficiency approach through rules, not by case-by-case tradeoffs. Thus, for example, Bork31 (like Posner)32 believes that
mergers should be evaluated solely in terms of their efficiency
effects, yet would not allow an efficiencies defense. Their
approach to mergers giving rise both to allocative inefficiency
from higher prices and productive efficiency gains from, for
example, economies of scale, would be to set the merger guideline
thresholds at a level calculated to allow most productive efficiency gains and prevent most allocative inefficiency losses. They
would perform the market power/efficiencies trade-off implicitly, but not have an explicit, case-by-case efficiencies defense. 33
Their efficiency approach would thus be implemented through
relatively clear rules that would optimize business planning and
judicial administration.

c.

Efficiency's embrace by the Reagan administration

It is hardly surprising that President Reagan's first choices
to head the antitrust enforcement agencies adopted the efficiency standard. The administration's first Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust, William Baxter, was succinct and clear:

31

R.

32

R.

BORK,

supra note 9, at 221-22.

POSNER, ANTITRUST

LAw:

AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

(1976).
33

R.

BORK,

supra note 9, at 221-22; R. Posner, supra note 10.

112
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"The only goal of antitrust is economic efficiency."34 So was
his successor, Paul McGrath. 3s This view was also embraced by
James C. Miller III, Reagan's first Chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission, most spectacularly in the Allied Corp.
case. 36
Allied appears to have been the first antitrust case where the
differences between the efficiency and price approaches to antitrust clearly were articulated and were pivotal to the enforcement decision.:r1 Allied involved a merger that would have
increased the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in various
industrial acid markets by as much as 416, to a level of as high
as 4,026 (figures that normally would suggest a challenge). The
FTC economist assigned to the case, Dr. Kenneth Kelly, argued
that even if the merger led to a price increase of 100/0 in the
affected markets (a generous estimate in light of the facts) the
merger would be unlikely to lead to any inefficiency since
demand for the acids was completely inelastic (i.e., even if price
34
Taylor, A Talk With Antitrust Chief William Baxter, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 4, 1982, at 28, col. 3. Baxter has also stated: "The fundamental
premise of our economic system is that the free market will achieve the
greatest possible efficiency in the allocation of resources and thereby
yield maximum productivity. . . . One of my principal objectives since
joining the Department has been to attempt to ensure that the antitrust
laws are enforced and interpreted to achieve that goal." Productivity in
the American Economy, 1982: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Employment and Productivity of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 478 (1982) (statement of William F. Baxter, Assistant Atty. Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of
Justice); Draftsman's View, supra note 30, at 619-20; Separation of
Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the 'Common Law' Nature of
Antitrust Law, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 661, 691-93 (1982).
35
McGrath, Statement of Mr. McGrath, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 131,
131 (1985).

36
In re Allied Corp., FfC File No. 811 0191 (Dec. 8, 1982)
("Allied").
37
This account of Allied is taken from FTC: WATCH, Pub. No.
158, "Cost-Benefit Analysis, Miller Style," 1, 1-5 (Jan. 14, 1983).
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rose by 100/0, the quantity sold would not diminish).38 Thus, the
10% price rise would "only" lead to a transfer of wealth from
the products' consumers to the industrial acids' producers, a
concern that Kelly (following Bork's lead) deemed irrelevant.
Moreover, there would be some inefficiency created if the Commission forced the firms to accept a consent order mandating
that Allied divest the affected assets. These costs included brokerage fees and private and FTC complia:nce costs. The Bureau
of Economics analysis concluded that since any resulting monetary transfer from the products' consumers to its producers was
irrelevant, and since ordering the divestiture would cause inefficiency, the merger should be approved even assuming prices
would rise by 10%.39
The issues in Allied can be illustrated by a version of Professor Williamson's famous diagram. 40 The rise in price from the
competitive level (pc) to the monopoly level (pm) normally produces both economic inefficiency (triangle I) and transfer of
wealth from consumers to the firm with market power (rectangle T). Productive efficiency gains from the merger would lower
the firm's costs, from Pc down to the lower dashed line, resulting in the efficiency savings marked E. In the Allied case, area
E was essentially nonexistent-since demand was inelastic within
the relevant range the demand curve was vertical. If the wealth
transfer from consumers to the merged firm, area T, did not
count, the productive efficiency benefits from allowing the
merger would mandate its approval.
Chairman Miller cast the only vote endorsing the efficiencybased recommendation not to sue. He termed any monopoly
overcharges mere "revenue transfers" that should not factor
into the enforcement analysis. Miller's decision may have been

38

ld.

39
Kelly's novel analysis was endorsed by Bureau of Economics
Director Dr. Robert Tollison. Tollison also would not count the wealth
transfer effects of the merger. See 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) 1061 (Dec. 9, 1982).
40
Williamson first presented his analysis in Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. EeoN. REV. 18 (1968).
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influenced by an article by Professor Timothy Muris (later
Miller's Director of the Bureau of Competition) that was precisely on point. Muris argued that only efficiency should count
in merger analysis and that a merger producing a net increase in
efficiency should be allowed even if it led to significantly higher
prices to consumers for a significant period of time.41
41
Muris presented a detailed analysis of the legislative history of
the Celler-Kefauver Act and argued that Congress meant for mergers to
be evaluated solely in efficiency terms. See Muris, The Efficiency
Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
381, 393-402 (1980). For a point-by-point refutation of Muris' analysis,
see Lande, supra note 8, at 132 n.2S8.
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The Commissioners appointed by President Carter disagreed. They all voted to accept a proposed consent order that
included divestiture of the offending assets. They understood
clearly the differences between the efficiency and wealth extraction approaches; Commissioner Clanton, joined by Commissioners Bailey and Pertschuk, concluded that "preventing such
transfers is one of the goals of the antitrust laws. "42
Another illustration of the Reagan administration's singlemindedness can be found in the DOJ's 1985 Vertical Restraints
Guidelines.43 Its section on tying lists a large number of reasons
why tying can be procompetitive, but acknowledges no circumstance under which purely private uses of tying, even by a cartel
or monopolist, could ever be anticompetitive.44 One inevitably
leaves this section, the Guidelines' most illogical, wondering
why it does not treat tying as per se legal. The explanation for
their approach undoubtedly lies in the Department's desire to
equate "anticompetitive" with "inefficient"; i. e., their desire to
implement the view that the only concern of antitrust is efficiency. The Department's ideological blinders must have ,caused
them to misread or ignore the tying standard set forth in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984)
("Hyde").4s This case can best be explained as condemning certain instances of tying because of wealth transfer effects.46

42

FTC:

WATCH,

supra note 37, at 3.

43
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vertical Distribution Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (1985).
44

Id., at Sec. 5.

4S
Hyde involved a contract between a fIrm of anesthesiologists and
a hospital requiring all anesthesiological services for the hospital's
patients to be performed by that firm. A competing anesthesiologist
tried to obtain privileges to practice at the hospital and was denied on
the basis of the contract. For a more detailed discussion see Sims,
"'Monsanto,' 'Hyde' Rulings Put Baxter Slightly Ahead," Legal
Times, Apr. 16, 1984, at 14.

46
For a more complete analysis of tying arrangements using both
wealth transfer and effIciency criteria, see R. Lande, "Untangling
Tying" (1988) (unpublished manuscript) (draft).
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Although the maj ority opinion in Hyde certainly appreciated
the value of efficient tying arrangements,47 it complained that
they also "may be used as a counting device to effect price discrimination, and they may be used to force a full line of products on the customer so as to extract more easily from him a
monopoly return on one unique product in the line.' '48 Tying
was held to be anticompetitive since it "can increase the social
costs of market power by facilitating price discrimination,
thereby increasing monopoly profits over what they would be
absent the tie. . . . "49 The court explained how anticompetitive tying can lead to undesirable extractions of wealth
by the firm with market power: "Sales of the tied item can be
used to measure demand for the tying item; purchasers with
greater needs for the tied item make larger purchases and in
effect must pay a higher price to obtain the tying item."so
While five Justices' views can best be explained in terms of
wealth transfers, O'Connor's concurring opinion is close to
pure Chicago School analysis. This opinion largely ignores the
producer-consumer battle, holding that the relevant question is
whether tying can ever cause inefficiency. It argues that this
rarely occursSI and that even in these unlikely circumstances the
inefficiencies from the tie must be balanced against any economic benefits.52 It condemned a tying firm's "exploitation of
47
"Basic to the faith that a free economy best promotes the public
weal is-[the assumption] that the public, acting through the market's
impersonal judgment, shall allocate the Nation's resources." Hyde, at
12 (quoting Times-Picayune Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605
(1953».

48
Hyde at 13 n. 19 (quoting Fortner Enterprises v. -United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 512 (1968) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes
omitted).

49
Hyde at 14 (citing United States Steel v. Fortner Enterprises, 429
U.S. 610, 617 (1977).
50

ld. at 15 n. 23.

51

ld. at 36-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

52

ld. at 40-41.
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consumers"S3 and the "increase [in] the profit it can extract
from . . . consumers. . . . "S4 The opinion, however, held that
even the use of tying to price discriminate is not necessarily
undesirabless and largely focused upon the potential efficiencies
and inefficiencies created by tying arrangements. S6 It cited
primarily the work of BorkS7 and other Chicago School
scholars. S8
Thus, the views of most Reagan administration antitrust
enforcers, as well as the views of many Reagan appointed
judges, are clear and pure. But while the Supreme Court has
become increasingly receptive to the use of economic analysis in
antitrust analysis it has never accepted the administration's suggestion to confme antitrust to effi~iency considerations.

D. The Supreme Court's partial embrace of efficiency
The Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that when it
passed the antitrust laws, "Congress was dealing with competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought
to prevent. "59 Yet, the Court rarely has found the need to state
precisely what "competition" embraces. While there are older

53

ld. at 35.

54

ld. at 36.

55

ld. at 36 n. 4.

56
"A tie-in should be condemned only when its anticompetitive
impact outweighs its contribution to efficiency." ld. at 42.
57

ld. at 36.

58
For example, O'Connor cites Landes & Posner, Market Power in
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 954 (1981) at 37 n. 7, and Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19,

21-23 (1957) at 39 n. 9.
59
Standard Oil v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49
(1951) (quoting A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
135 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943).
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cases that are relatively explicit,60 only since the landmark opinion in Continental T. V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36
(1977) has a specific concern with efficiency consistently been at
the forefront of Supreme Court antitrust analysis. 61 This case
was followed shortly by Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1978) ("BMr') and others.62 Moreover, in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330
60
For example, in Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 4 (1958), the Court stated:
The Sherman Act . . . rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
See also United States v. E. L Du Pont de Nemours Co., 351 U.S. 377,
386 (1956) ("A considerable size is often essential for efficient operation
in research, manufacture and distribution"); Connell Constr. Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 623 (1975) ("[C]ompetition based on efficiency is a positive value that the antitrust laws
strive to protect").

61
In Sylvania the Court changed the standard of analysis for nonprice vertical restraints from per se illegality to the rule of reason largely
because of the efficiencies they generate. The Court noted that while
vertical restrictions can reduce competition in a number of ways:
Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the
distribution of his products. These "redeeming virtues" are
implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under
the rule of reason. Economists have identified a number of
ways in which manufacturers can use such restrictions to
compete more effectively against other manufacturers. ld. at
54-55.
62
BMI justified a blanket licensing provision because it "reduces
cost" (id. at 21), would "serve a market need" (id. at 17 n. 27), obviates
certain transaction costs (id.), and because "a bulk license of some type
is a necessary consequence of the integration necessary to achieve these
efficiencies, and a necessary consequence of an aggregate license is that
its price must be established." ld. The Court inquired whether the purpose of the practice was:
(Footnote continued on following page)
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(1979), Chief Justice Burger stated that the Sherman Act's legislative debates "suggest that Congress designed the Sherman Act
as a 'consumer welfare prescription' " (citing R. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978».63 Of course, Bork has asserted
that the "consumer welfare prescription" embodied in the antitrust laws is limited to a concern with economic efficiency.64
As the Court's subsequent discussion makes clear, however,
it almost certainly was unaware that "consumer welfare," as
Bork defines it, has little or nothing to do with the welfare of
consumers. Moreover, Reiter implies that the antitrust laws contain wealth transfer goals and a strong preference for consumers:
It is in the sound commercial interests of the retail purchasers of

goods and services to obtain the lowest price possible within the
framework of our competitive private enterprise system. . . . Here,

(Footnote continued from previous page)
to threaten the proper operation of our predominantly freemarket economy-that is, whether the practice facially appears
to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output, or instead one designed to
"increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather
than less, competitive" (citing United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n. 16 (1978). ld. at 19-20.
In National Soc) of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978), the Court struck an anticompetitive association canon of
ethics because "[tJhe Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that
ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also
better goods and services." ld. at 695. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978), the Court commented
upon "the potential of serious distortion of the rational and efficient
allocation of resources, and the efficiency of fiee markets which the
regime of competition embodied in the antitrust laws is thought to
engender." The Court in United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422,441 n. 16
(1978), observed that a certain exchange of information among competitors "does not invariably have anticompetitive effects; indeed such
practices can in certain circumstances increase economic efficiency and
render markets more, rather than less, competitive."
63

442 U.S. at 343.

64

R.

BORK,

supra note 9, Chapter 2.
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where petitioner alleges a wrongful deprivation policy of her money
because the price of the hearing aid she bought was artificially
inflated by reason of respondents' anticompetitive conduct, she has
alleged an injury in her 'property.' . . . [The treble-damages remedy
was passed] as a means of protecting consumers from overcharges
resulting from price fixing. 6s

Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Hyde demonstrates
that the view that antitrust should only be concerned with
economic efficiency may have as many as four Supreme Court
votes. But, for the present, a majority appears reluctant to
restrict antitrust to efficiency. This cursory overview of recent
cases has shown a trend from a concern with competition to a
concern with the efficiency that results from competition. But the
Chicagoist victory is not complete.

II. The "counterrevolution" begins
A. Analyzing the legislative history correctly
Many older cases imply that one purpose of the antitrust
laws is to prevent the formation of market power that, when
exercised, transfers wealth from consumers to firms with market
power. 66 Yet, although many doubted Bork's legislative history
65
442 U.S. at 339-43. This language accords with statements from
earlier cases implying wealth transfer principles. For example, in
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1%7), the Court implied
that it was an antitrust goal to "protect the public from price gouging
by dealers who had monopoly power. . . . " In Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 263 (1976), Justice White, in dicta in a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that "[t]he antitrust laws are
aimed at preventing monopoly profits and price fixing, which gouge the
consumer. "

66
See, e.g., Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machine, 392 U.S. 481,
489 (1967); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477,486 (1976); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S.
305, 309 n. 9 (1956) (condemned an "intent to gouge consumers");
Associated General Contractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983)
("the Sherman Act was enacted to assure consumers the benefits of
price competition. . . ").
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analysis,67 well over a decade passed before Bork's conclusions
were challenged in detail. 68
Bork had correctly noted that the Sherman Act's legislative
history is replete with concern over the higher prices facing consumers as a result of monopoly pricing. But he was mistaken
that Congressional concern fairly can be equated to a desire to
avoid economic inefficiency. None of the quotations Bork
presents suggest that Congress was even aware that supracompetitive prices lead to economic efficiency. 69 Even leading
economists of the day had only a tenuous understanding of this
concept70 and, as conservative Nobel Laurate George Stigler
reminds us, no economist had any significant effect on the
Sherman Act's passage. 71 Not surprisingly, Bork's hundreds of
67
See, e.g., Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat
From Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974, 976-79 (1977) (using common sense to
conclude that Congress must have been more concerned about wealth
transfers than efficiency).
68
See Lande, supra note 8. The legislative history material in this
article has been taken from this source.
69

See Bork, supra note 8, passim.

70
Scherer observed that although a few nineteenth century economists discussed what we today term allocative efficiency insofar as it
related to taxation and the government regulation of public utilities:
"The notion of a 'deadweight welfare-loss triangle' entered the mainstream of Anglo-American economics in the first edition [1890] of Marshall's Principles [citation omitted]." Scherer, supra note 67, at 977
n. 20. Moreover, the first rigorous discussion of allocative efficiency did
not appear until 1938. HoteIIing, The General Welfare in Relation to
Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938). Even this relatively modern analysis did not discuss the
antitrust implications of allocative inefficiency.

71
"A careful student of the history of economics would have
searched long and hard, on July 2, 1890, the day the Sherman Art was
signed by President Harrison, for any economist who had ever recommended the policy of activity combating collusion or monopolization in
the economy at large." Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of
Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1982). Professor Hofstadter
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citations to the 1890 debates fail to contain evidence that even a
single Congressman knew that monopoly pricing is inefficient.
Put simply, Congress did not condemn the trusts for a lack of
efficiency.
Congress was well aware, however, that higher prices transfer wealth from consumers to firms with market power. The
debates strongly suggest that Congress condemned trusts and
monopolies for exactly this reason.72 For example, Senator Sherman termed monopolistic overcharges "extortion which makes
the people poor," and "extorted wealth. "73 Congressman Coke
referred to the overcharges as "robbery. "74 Representative
Heard declared that the trusts, "without rendering the slightest
equivalent," have "stolen untold millions from the people."7s
Congressman Wilson complained that a particular trust "robs
the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other.' '76
Representative Fithian declared that the trusts were "impoverishing" the people through "robbery."77 Senator Hoar declared
that monopolistic pricing was "a transaction the direct purpose
of which is to extort from the community . . . wealth which
observed that "[t]he Sherman Act was framed and debated in the preexpert era, when economists as a professional group were not directly
consulted by legislators. But even if they had been, they would have
given mixed and uncertain advice." R. Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style
in American Politics and Other Essays 199-200 (1965).
72
This paper only analyzes the legislative history of the Sherman
Act. For a similar analysis of the legislative history of the Clayton Act,
Federal Trade Commission Act, and Celler-Kefauver Act, demonstrating that these laws' framers cared more about wealth transfers than efficiency, see Lande, supra note 8.
73

21 Congo Rec. 2461 (1890).

74

ld. at 2614.

75

ld. at 410l.

76

ld. at 4098.

77
ld. at 4103 (Fifthian was reading, with apparent approval, a letter from a constituent).
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ought to be generally diffused over the whole community.»7S
Senator George complained: "They aggregate to themselves great
enormous wealth by extortion which makes the people poor."79
These value-laden condemnations of the wealth extraction
effects of monopoly pricing show a much broader concern than
economic efficiency. A fair reading of the Sherman Act's legislative history reveals that it is largely a consumer protection statute.
Congress' primary reason for passing the antitrust laws was to
prevent consumers from paying more than the competitive level
for their goods and services. Bork tried to make the stockholders
of monopolies and cartels into honorary consumers; the consumers that Congress wanted to protect included only purchasers
of goods and services. 80
B. Triangles and rectangles disentangled
Despite the common sense that truly underlay Congressional
intent it is not difficult to understand how Bork's story gained
such widespread acceptance. Perhaps the most important reason
was his clever but deceptive selection of his key term, "consumer welfare," as the lodestar of antitrust. Few people realize
how he counterintuitively defined it to exclude a concern with
the welfare of ordinary consumers. Bork succeeded in promot-

78

Id. at 2728.

79
Id. at 1768. Senator George continued: "Then making this
extorted wealth the means of further extortion from their unfortunate
victims, the people of the United States, they pursue unmolested, unrestrained by law. . . . [fhey] have extorted their ill-gotten gains from
the poor and then used the money thus obtained to complete the ruin of
the people." Id. Senator George complained that consumers were being
robbed. Id. at 3150. He also complained that the trusts were able to
"fleece and rob the people." Id.

80
This article asserts that the wealth transfer standard should govern antitrust because Congress has so ordered, not because it is the superior approach. That is the subject of another article that the author is
working on.
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ing this interpretation largely because the subject is extremely
complex; few understand that monopoly prices lead to both
allocative inefficiency and a transfer of wealth from consumers
to the monopolist. As Bork translated legislative intent into triangles and rectangles and then back to an appealing term like
"consumer welfare," few discovered what he had really done. 81
Even the Supreme Court appears to have been confused. 82 Perhaps the clearest illustration of the complexity of the issues is
that Bork, in his landmark legislative history analysis, twice
appeared to suggest that the antitrust laws are concerned with
wealth transfers from consumers to firms with market power! 83
81
I have argued elsewhere that Bork's interpretations of Congressional intent in his original area of specialization demonstrate that he is
a judicial activist for his ideological causes. Contrary to his protestations and those of his champions, Bork selectively interprets Congressional will to suit his own agenda; he does not defer to a Congress that
had different goals. Bork saves his "strict constructionist" view of a
judge's role for instances when this posture is consistent with his preferred ends. In other cases he finds a way to reach the result demanded by
his ideology and denounces contrary conclusions as "unconstitutional."
See Lande, Just Where Does Judge Bork Stand?-An Anti-Antitrust
Activist? NAT'L L.J., Sept. 7, 1987, at 13 col. 4. Most of this article's
discussions of Bork's views are taken from this piece or from Lande,
supra note 8.

82

Recall the discussion of Reiter, supra Section I(D).

83
Bork observed that the argument in Congress for a rule against
monopolistic mergers "derived in large measure from a desire to protect
consumers from monopoly extortion. . . . Where producer and consumer welfare might come into conflict. . . Congress chose consumer
welfare as decisive." Bork, supra note 8, at 11. A concern with
"monopoly extortion" and "consumer," as opposed to "producer"
welfare would seem to be identical to a concern with the income distribution effects of economic activity that Bork repeatedly said were to
have nothing to do with antitrust.
In addition, Bork discussed § 1 of Sherman's bill in a way that indicated his belief that Congress employed price, not efficiency, as its standard. "[T]hat bill declared illegal two classes of arrangements,
contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations: (1) those made with a
view, or which tend, to prevent full and free competition, and (2) those
designed, or which tend, to advance the cost to consumer of articles of
commerce." [d. at 15 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Bork ana-
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If even Bork can use the concepts imprecisely it is not surprising

so many were confused.

c.

Administrability counterarguments

The efficiency approach, if carried out through clearly
designed rules (such as well specified merger guidelines rather
than the ad hoc case-by-case analysis used during much of the
Reagan administration), would indeed prove relatively more
workable than a "big is bad, small is good" approach. But an
efficiency orientation is certainly no easier to administer and no
more predictable than a price (that is, a wealth transfer)
approach. Under each the required quantities-a prediction of
both market power and efficiencies-are virtually identical.
From a theoretical perspective both involve ascertaining virtually the same triangles and rectangles. 84 From a practical perspective, both are often unworkable on a case-by-case basis
since the required quantities are generally unknowable. 85 Both
necessitate implementation through general presumptions or
rules. But the two approaches lead to very different rules. 86
lyzed this language in the following manner. "Sherman employed these
two criteria of illegality in every measure he presented to the Senate. The
first test, which subjects all firms to market forces, is hardly a means of
preserving social values that consumers are not willing to pay for. It can
be reconciled only with a consumer-welfare policy. The second test is
even more explicit. The touchstone of illegality is raising prices to consumers. There were no exceptions. Sherman wanted the courts not
merely to be influenced by the consumer interest but to be controlled
completely by it." Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
84
The "price to consumers" standard actually requires less information and is more workable. See A. Fisher, F. Johnson & R. Lande,
Mergers, Market Power and Property Rights: When Will Efficiencies
Prevent Price Increases? (September, 1985) (unpublished manuscript)
(FTC Working Paper No. 130).

8S

R. BORK, supra note 9, at 125-26.

86
Bork wrote that mergers should be evaluated solely in terms of
efficiency effects. He would evaluate mergers that gave rise both to allo-
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Consider two differences that would arise if a new set of
federal antitrust enforcers attempted to use a supposedly
"unconstitutional" antitrust law to prevent consumers from
being forced to pay monopoly extortion. 87 Both would lead to
significantly more aggressive antitrust enforcement.
The first would be the undramatic lowering of the DOJ
Merger Guidelines' numerical threshold levels. For illustration,
reconsider the diagram and the Williamsonian approach to
merger enforcement discussed in Section I(C), supra. Suppose
we formulate merger guidelines based only on the efficiency criteria, and suppose we believe that the point where the inefficiencies from most mergers outweigh their efficiency benefits
occurs on the average when a merger produces an HHI increase
of 200 to a level of 2000 (figures closer to the current "practical" levels used by the Department of Justice, despite the nominally lower levels written into the 1984 Merger Guidelines).
Now, consider the effect of also incorporating the wealth transfer effects of the merger. As the diagram illustrates, these
effects are almost always large relative to the accompanying
inefficiency effects.88 Incorporation of Congress' intent to count
these transfers would produce significantly lower merger guidelines than would the efficiency approach.89 But administrability
would not be affected.
More dramatically, consider a merger that produced an efficient monopolist that would raise prices significantly (recall the
cative inefficiency (from higher price) and productive efficiency gains
(from, for example, economies of scale) by setting the thresholds of illegality in the merger guidelines high enough to allow most productive
efficiency gains and prevent most allocative inefficiency losses. But he
would not allow a generalized efficiencies defense. R. BoRK, supra note
9, at 221-22.
ff1
For additional differences, see Sims & Lande, The End of
Antitrust-or a New Beginning? 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 301, 316-18 (1986).

88

See discussion infra at Section III(B).

89
The particulars of the tradeoff calculations are extremely complex. See Fisher, Lande & Vandaele, Afterword: Could a Merger Lead
to Both a Monopoly and a Lower Price?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1697 (1983).
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Allied case, supra, Section I(C». The efficiency approach would
ask only whether the merger produced (net) efficiencies. If so,
one would approve the merger even though all the efficiency
savings from the merger would accrue to the monopolist while
consumers would be forced to pay significantly higher prices.
By co~trast, an "unconstitutional" merger policy truly based
upon Congressional intent would block such mergers. A
"wealth transfer" or "price to consumer" approach to merger
enforcement would ask a different question: is the merger likely
to lead to significantly higher prices for consumers? If the
answer is "yes" the merger would be blocked, even though this
would prevent the formation of an efficient monopoly. Congress cared more about protecting consumers from monopoly
extortion than obtaining the "benefits" of allowing efficient
monopolies. Again, the result would be different, but it would
be at least ~qually administrable.

Ironically, while the efficiency school's founders' concern
for predictability and objective administrability was admirable,
some of their disciples in the Reagan administration appear not
to have fully grasped their teachers' message. Perhaps the disciples focused too much on the technical aspects of Chicago
School economics at the expense of broader Chicago School
philosophical concerns. For example, the 1984 Merger Guidelines in effect announce that the Department will listen to any
type of efficiency claim and give it any weight the Department
deems appropriate.!lO This approach to merger enforcement
inflicts administrability and business planning havoc comparable
to that committed by the social and political approach the Chicagoists denounce on predictability grounds. Thus, even though
the efficiency school gained many adherents because of its
promise of superior administration, its practical implementation
cannot be shown to be superior.
90
u.s. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines (1984), 2 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 1 4494.103 at 4.135. For other examples of how the current
Merger Guidelines do not embody clear rules, see Sims & Lande, "DOJ
Adds Revisionist Dollop to '82 Merger Guidelines," Legal Times, June
25, 1984 at 15, col. 1.
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III. The start of efficiency's decline
A. The Ucounterrevolution" gains momentum

It is not surprising that many established moderate and liberal antitrust scholars quickly endorsed the idea that an important goal of antitrust is to protect consumers from monopoly
overcharges. It would have been startling if scholars such as
Professors Adams, Brodley, Flynn, Fox, Pitofsky, Schwartz or
L. Sullivan rejected the idea. Of perhaps greater significance
has been this view's adoption by antitrust's most influential
"centrist" academic and its embrace by an outstanding group
of relatively young scholars who comprise a large portion of the
emerging generation of influential antitrust academics.
In 1980 Professor Areeda appeared to endorse the view that
economic efficiency should be the only factor in antitrust analYsis. 9) He stated more recently that a broader perspective was
appropriate, observing that even if a hypothetical, perfectly discriminating cartel caused no inefficiency:
[It] is taking from some people and giving to the other people more
than competition would. I regard this as an anticompetitive distortion. "Consumer welfare" embraces what individual consumers are
entitled to expect from a competitive economy. If the efficiency
extremists insist that only their definition of consumer welfare is
recognized by economists, we would answer that ours is clearly
recognized by the statutes. The legislative history of the Sherman Act
is not clear on much but it is clear on this.92

Many younger scholars concur.93 Professor Hovenkamp,
a self-described Chicago School "fellow traveler" for some
91
See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR ApPLICATION 149 n. 2 (1980).

92 Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J.
523, 536 (1983). Since Areeda testified in favor of Bork's nomination to
the Supreme Court it would be interesting to know whether Bork was
one of the "efficiency extremists" to whom Areeda referred.
93
"Younger" is used as a relative term to include open-minded
thinkers even if they have some gray hair.
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time,94 now explicitly embraces wealth transfers as an important
concern of antitrusU' Professors Campbell,96 Jorde,97 Kaplow,98
Kovacic,99 Krattenmaker, 100 Ross, 101 Salop,I02 T. Sullivan, 103

94
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv.
213 (1985).

9S
Hovenkamp recently addressed the issue of the legislative intent
behind the antitrust laws and concluded that efficiency was not the primary concern of the Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman Act or the
Celler-Kefauver Act. Id. at 250. He termed Bork's Sherman Act legislative history analysis the strongest argument in favor of efficiency but
concluded that "Bork's work has been called into question by subsequent scholarship showing that . . . Congress had no real ~oncept of
efficiency and was really concerned with protecting consumers from
unfavorable wealth transfers." Id.

96
TRUST

See Campbell, Has Economics Rationalized Antitrust?, 52 ANTI.
L.J. 607, 617 (1983) (focusing largely upon the Robinson-Patman

Act).
97
See, e.g., Harris & Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 14-16 (1984).
98
Kaplow, The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis
and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1817, 1822-23
(1982).

99

See Kovacic's article in this volume.

100
Krattenmaker & Salop, An Antitrust Analysis of Exclusionary
Behavior, 94 YALE L.J. 209, 279-80 (1986).
101
See S. Ross, Sports Broadcasting, Antitrust, and Public Policy,
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, l00th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(Oct. 6, 1987).

102

See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 100.

103
Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court's
Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1
(1982).
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WileylOi and many others have come to similar conclusions.
Unlike the earlier list of more established scholars, each views
antitrust questions mostly or entirely in economic terms. But their
economics embraces more than efficiency.
The State Attorneys General, rapidly becoming an important
factor in the antitrust world, agree. They vigorously endorsed
wealth transfers as the primary concern of merger policy in their
1987 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. lOS And, although courts still
generally do not focus upon the differences between the
approaches, some are beginning to recognize that Bork's defInition of "consumer welfare" is too narrow lD6 or is in doubt. 107
104
Wiley has expressed this view in several articles. See. e.g.• Revision and Apology in Antitrust Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1277. 1283
n. 32 (1987); Antitrust and Core Theory. 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 556, 587
n. 109 (1987); A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism. 99 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 749 n. 165 (1986); t< 'After Chicago' An Exaggerated
Demise?" 6 DUKE L.J. 1006, 1011 n. 38 (1986).

lOS
"When a firm or firms exercise market power by profitably
maintaining prices above competitive levels for a significant period of
time a transfer of wealth from consumers to those firms occurs. This
transfer of wealth is the major evil sought to be addressed by section 7."
Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys
General, 52 Special Supp. Antitrust & Trade Reg. (BNA) No. 1306, at
S-4 (March 12. 1987) (footnotes omitted).

106
See Judge Wald's concurrence to Judge Bork's opinion in
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines. 792 F.2d 210, 231, n. 3
(D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Even if one thinks that the Court intended to exclude
all other considerations, the phrase 'consumer welfare' surely includes
more than simple economic efficiency"). The Court in Inglis & Sons
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1032 (9th
Cir. 1981), eert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). shrewdly observed:
Most commentators who have attempted to develop economic
tests of predatory pricing have assumed that the goal of these
tests should be the efficient allocation of society's resources, or.
in the language of welfare economics. the improvement of
allocative efficiency. • . . The relevance of the economic tests
so developed. however. must then depend in large part on
whether allocative efficiency is a primary goal of the antitrust
laws. . . . [In our opinion] the search for allocative efficiency
may lead one to accept conduct that is plainly anticompetitive.
107

Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co .• 727 F.2d 692. 701. n. 9 (1984).
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B. The Reagan administration's no longer solid front
Many Reagan Administration antitrust officials remain
faithful to Baxter and Miller's legacy. lOS For example, the current Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Charles F. Rule,
confidently asserts that the only goal of the antitrust laws is to
maximize economic efficiency. 109 He affirmatively declines to
enforce the antitrust laws in a manner that favors consumers
over cartels, noting: "[1]t is not necessarily clear who--the consumer or the producer-is more worthy of the surplus generated
by a particular transaction. "llO Rule combatively opines that
"all too often" those ,not sharing his beliefs are engaging in
"demagoguery"lll and asserts that including values other than
efficiency in antitrust "is a prescription for tyranny. "lIZ
Federal Trade Commission Chairman Daniel Oliver uses
equally strident language. ll3 But Oliver's statements about the
lOS
FfC Commissioner Calvani, for example, strongly maintains
that the only proper concern of antitrust is economic efficiency. See
Calvani, Consumer Welfare Is Prime Objective of Antitrust, Legal
Times, Dec. 24/31, 1984, at 14 col. 1.
109
C. Rule, Remarks at the 21st New England Antitrust Conference,
Antitrust, Consumers and Small Business, Cambridge, MA, passim,
especially at pp. 3-6, 8-9 (Nov. 13, 1987).
110

Id. at 4-5.

11l

Id. at 1.

112

Id. at 9.

113
In a recent interview Chairman Oliver stated that under the
Administration's approach to evaluating mergers and acquisitions "the
crucial question is whether such transactions will substantially lessen
competition-and hence injure consumers-by increasing price or
reducing output." Statement of Chairman Oliver, 57 ANTITRUST L.J.
235, 237 (1988). Oliver then denounced "counter-revolutionaries" (id.
at 241) who advocate "nonlearning-antitrust laws as a mechanism to
prevent wealth transfers." Id. at 242 (quoting Professor Rose with
approval) (citation omitted). Oliver also denounced "[t]he confiscatory,
redistributive, and wealth-destructive policies of yesterday's [antitrust
enforcement]. Id. at 243.
(Footnote continued on following page)
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subject contradict one another; either he misunderstands the
price/efficiency distinction or deliberately confuses it in an
attempt to make it appear that he cares about protecting consumers from monopoly extortion. 1u
Further evidence of a "counterrevolution" is, however, provided by the Reagan Administration's no longer solid support
for a pure efficiency model. This is prominently evidenced by
the Administration's proposed Merger Modernization Act of
1986. The Administration proposed changing Section 7's ban
against certain mergers the effect of which may be "substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,"
to a requirement that forbidden mergers "increase the ability to
exercise market power."1IS The Bill adds: "For the purposes of
this section, the ability to exercise market power is defined as
the ability of one or more firms profitably to maintain prices
above competitive levels for a significant period of time. "116
This is virtually the equivalent of a wealth transfer standard
since any merger that leads to higher prices to consumers will be
blocked, regardless of whether it produces net efficiencies. Effi(Footnote continued from previous page)
Oliver has contradicted himself. Merger enforcement aimed at preventing higher prices to consumers does prevent wealth transfers from
consumers to firms with market power. Merger enforcement that
ignored wealth transfer concerns would permit higher prices to consumers so long as the resulting monopoly was efficient. Oliver cannot
both be in favor of protecting consumers from injury caused by higher
prices and also be against preventing wealth transfers from consumers
to firms with market power.
Perhaps Chairman Oliver doesn't realize that it is the cartels and
monopolies (not the antitrust laws) that are engaging in the redistribution of wealth. The antitrust laws are supposed to be used to prevent
cartels and monopolies from using their market power to extract consumers' wealth. This wealth is the property of consumers because Congress gave consumers the right to purchase competitively priced goods.
114

ld.

115
See S. 2160, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a) (1986). The Bill would
make many other changes, including a new standard of proof.
116

ld. at § 2(d).
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ciencies "deriving from the acquisition" are relevant only insofar as they affect the firm's ability to increase prices. 1I7
It is, of course,. unclear the extent to which the Administration's merger proposal represented its preferred solution,118 a
concession to political reality, 119 or a recognition that in many
circumstances an efficiency standard will provide less clarity for

117
ld. Interestingly, both the 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines are
ambiguous as to whether more than economic efficiency will count in
the Department's merger analysis, merely noting that a merger can
cause both: "[T]he result [of market power] is a transfer of wealth from
buyers to sellers and a misallocation of resources." U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines 1982, 2 TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) , 4501 (footnote
omitted); 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 90 at '4491.
118
A strong supporter of such legislation, former Assistant Attorney
General Douglas H. Ginsburg, noted:
Under the Merger Modernization Act [of 1986], an efficiencyenhancing but price-increasing merger could be interdicted. As
a matter of enforcement discretion, however, I would have been
unlikely, as Assistant Attorney General, to have opposed a
merger that was demonstrably efficient. At the same time, I
hasten to point out, however, that I did not find the efficiencies
claim persuasive in any of the admittedly few merger reviews
where the point was argued. . . . [However,] [p]articularly in
view of the infrequency with which efficiency showings can
convincingly be made on behalf of a proposed merger, a pricedriven standard for mergers would do more to avoid lost
efficiencies through over-enforcement (of the Von's, Brown, or
PNB sort) than could possibly be lost by the occasional blocking of a merger that would be both price and efficiency
enhancing.
Letter from Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg to Robert H. Lande (Feb. 3,
1988). Ginsburg cautions that one carefully should observe the distinction "between the interpretation of present law and a proposal for
change, such as the Merger Modernization Act." ld.
119
Neither the Antitrust Division nor the FfC has ever publicly
stated that it refused to challenge a merger, despite the expectation of
higher prices, because of anticipated efficiencies. They are not so
foolish-imagine the reaction in Congress if either the FfC or the Antitrust Division announced it would not challenge a merger likely to lead
to significantly higher prices for consumers because the resulting
monopoly would be efficient!
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businesses and will be harder to administer.l20 But it matters
little.
There is even an indication that Judge Easterbrook may be
starting to mellow. A Reagan appointee, Judge Easterbrook has
long been a respected advisor and mentor to many Reagan
Administration antitrust officials and one of the most influential members of antitrust's efficiency school. 121 He recently
wrote that when Congress passed the Sherman Act:
The choice they saw was between leaving consumers at the mercy of
trusts and authorizing the judges to protect consumers. However you
slice the legislative history, the dominant theme is the protection of
consumers from overcharges. 122

120
For example, Posner admits that in certain cirCUIqstances efficiency is too difficult to measure. He advocates instead using an output
test. See, e.g., Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 6, 21
(1981). Since restricted output causes supracompetitive prices, an output
standard is very similar to a proscription against practices that lead to
higher prices for consumers.
There are, of course, some differences between an output standard
and a wealth transfer standard. In cases where output is completely
inelastic, such as in Allied, discussed supra, Section I(C), the two standards would lead to different results. In addition, Posner would not
appear to condemn Areeda's hypothetical, perfectly price-discriminating
cartel since such a cartel would not reduce output.
An output standard also was recently proposed by the Director of
the FrC's Office of Policy Development, Nolan Clark. He argues that
the Sherman Act's proscription against certain practices "in restraint of
trade" (26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 1 (1976» was
meant to constitute a ban against practices that restrain output (since
trade is only restrained when output decreases). Clark contrasts his proposal with an efficiency standard and explains why reduced output and
reduced efficiency are not identical. See Clark, Antitrust Comes Full
Circle: The Return to the Cartelization Standard, 38 VAND. L. REv.
1125, 1168-70 (1985).
.
121
See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L.
REv. 1, 3-4 (1984).

122
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L.
1702-03 (1986).
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Easterbrook then asserted:
This turns out to be the same program as one based on "efficiency."
There are differences at the margins. . . but the differences are not
very important. . . [especially because] [i]n the long run consumers
gain most from a policy that emphasized allocative and productive
efficiency. 123
Easterbrook thus appears to concede that the wealth transfer
view of the antitrust laws' legislative histories is more accurate,
but argues that it leads to conclusions that differ only slightly
from the efficiency approach.
If the gap between the Chicago School and the adherents of a
wealth transfer approach has narrowed to an acceptance of the
latter perspective with disagreement over how important it will be
for antitrust, this article's thrust has been overly cautious. Antitrust soon will march in a new direction. Only after we have
worked out these differences will we truly know where its destination lies.
This is not the place to analyze either the magnitude of the
differences between the two approaches or the practical effects of
these differences on various types of antitrust cases. But it is
noteworthy that the inefficiency effects of market power are
surprisingly modest. 124 Easterbrook recently estimated that they
123
ld. at 1703. It probably is true that the wealth transfer and efficiency approaches differ more in the short run. Long run and indirect
effects are more difficult to predict.
124
"The first estimate of the loss to the American economy caused
by monopolistic misallocations was presented by Arnold Harberger in
1954. If the results of Harberger's estimates were expressed in terms of
1982 dollars, they would be equal to approximately $12.00 per person
per year. . . . It is hardly surprising that other economists arrive at different estimates, some of which are lower than Harberger's, while others are larger (some even by a factor of 50). Scherer's review of the
evidence puts the figure 'between 0.5 and 2 percent of the gross national
product [between approximately $50 and $200 per person per year] with
estimates nearer the lower bound inspiring more confidence than those
on the higher side. . . .' The more important question is what the magnitude of this loss would be if there were no antitrust laws to act as both
deterrent and corrective systems. It may be impossible, however, to formulate a meaningful estimate of this figure." Lande, supra note 8, at 73
n.32.
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are half as large as the transfer effects,l25 a figure that is probably
an overestimate. l26 Even if we accept his estimate, however, we
must conclude that "what's wrong" with market power is
approximately trebled when the transfer is also included-a result
bound to lead to many significantly tighter antitrust rules. 127
At least two types of areas will be affected. First, antitrust
rules based upon a balance of procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects will shift and proscribe much more behavior. Horizontal
merger guidelines, for example, would be significantly lower if
the wealth transfer effects of mergers also are included. l28 Second,
practices without significant inefficiency effects could become
illegal if they are used by firms with market power to extract
wealth from consumers. Areeda's perfectly price-discriminating
cartel is one such example. As the discussion supra Section I(C)
suggests, some uses of tying or other vertical restraints to price
discriminate might be illegal only under a wealth transfer view. l29
And the Allied discussion, supra Section I(C) , shows that a
practice in an industry with relatively inelastic demand might also
be treated very differently if wealth transfers are considered.

125

Easterbrook, Panel Discussion, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 123, 126

(1986).
126
See Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger
Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1644-50 (1983).
127
This is only an approximation, and probably an underestimate of
the differences. One weighing approach would be to give wealth transfers equal weight to efficiency effects in the tradeoff calculations.
Another approach, probably more in line with Congressional intent,
would forbid any merger likely to lead to a significant extraction of consumers' surplus by firms with market power. The latter approach would
use price to consumers as its benchmark. In cases involving price discrimination, however, it might be more meaningful to focus upon
wealth transfers than consumer prices.
128

Fisher & Lande, supra note 126, passim.
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See also Lande, Untangling Tying (1988) (unpublished manuscript) (draft).

464 : The antitrust bulletin

IV. The future
Robert Bork's Supreme Court nomination was not rejected
because he refused to embrace more than efficiency in antitrust
analysis. But his rejection might portend that his antitrust views
also will come to be rejected.
When the efficiency-only view replaced the social/political
perspective many in the antitrust community refused to convert.
Some refused out of inertia, but most probably balked at supporting Bork's illogical reading of the antitrust laws' legislative
histories.
We appear to be at another watershed, one which may split
the antitrust community partly along generational lines. Relatively young, intellectually honest conservatives will tend to join
moderates and liberals of all ages in accepting the new wisdom.
Some will do so by admitting their past errors; others will attempt
to cloud the differences and their past positions. But many in the
efficiency school will be more rigid and close-minded, especially
those who have invested years or decades believing in its exclusivity. The future of antitrust will leave them behind, but because of
their strength what should be a peaceful transition will instead be
a lengthy struggle.
Like the previous round, this contest probably will be influenced not only by the actual intentions of the Congresses that
enacted the antitrust laws but by a Presidential election as well. If
conservativesl30 are placed in charge of the federal antitrust
enforcement agencies following the 1988 elections the efficiency
standard will die much more slowly. It is even possible that a
President Bush could appoint several justices to the Supreme
130
Terms like "conservative" have been used arbitrarily and with
license throughout this article. It is, of course, incorrect to view "conservatives" as opposed to vigorous antitrust enforcement and "liberals"
in favor. See, e.g., L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY at 146-50 (1980).
It is also incorrect to assume that the election of George Bush in 1988
will produce Reagan-era antitrust enforcement since many Republicans
favor strong antitrust enforcement.
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Court who agreed with Bork on the issue and the efficiency
school would reign for the foreseeable future.
If the Democrats capture the White House and retain control
of both houses of Congress, however, the transition will be much
more rapid. On the efficiency side probably would be several
Supreme Court justices, many Reagan-appointed federal judges,
a large percentage of established antitrust academics, and a
generally conservative defense bar. On the consumers' side would
be other Supreme Court justices and lower court judges, many
influential congressmen, the state and federal antitrust enforcers,
and at least a few increasingly astute plaintiffs' lawyers. 131 There
will also be growing pressure from an increasing number of
academics.
In many areas of the law academics have little impact. During

the past generation, however, an influential group of articulate,
aggressive antitrust scholars have developed and delineated the
effects of an efficiency-oriented view of antitrust policy and have
successfully advocated its implementation. The future of antitrust
is economics and efficiency will always be important. We will not
return to Brown Shoel32 antitrust for the foreseeable future, and
many of the reasons why antitrust has long been in decline will be
unaffected by the fall of efficiency's antitrust monopoly.133 But
the practical ramifications of a price (or wealth transfer) standard
are just beginning to be worked out. Aggressive academics, both
lawyers and economists, can be expected to rise to the opportunity and make compelling consumerist arguments to open minded
judges and justices. These "young Turks" will provide ideas for
and work symbiotically with consumer-oriented federal and state
antitrust enforcers and private plaintiffs for a revitalization of
antitrust.
131
For example, Fred Furth, who usually represents more antitrust
plaintiffs than defendants, underwrote most of the expenses for the
1987 Airlie House Conference that called for more vigorous antitrust
enforcement. Lawyers like Furth can be expected to use the wealth
transfer concept in litigation whenever so doing will benefit their clients.
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Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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For additional analysis, see Sims & Lande, supra note 87.

